125

Safeguard or Barrier: An Empirical
Examination of Bar Exam Cut Scores
Michael B. Frisby, Sam C. Erman, and Victor D. Quintanilla
In 2019, nearly 70,000 people took the bar exam.1 More than forty percent
failed.2 Given the existing scores required to pass those exams (the “cut score”),
nearly 30,000 test-takers otherwise qualified to practice law were lost to the
profession.3 Had the cut score been lower, many would now be lawyers.4 So
it goes every year, with staggering costs.5 Legal educators devote substantial
resources to teaching tens of thousands of people legal skills that never get
put to use in law practice. A national crisis in access to justice grows more
entrenched. Applicants invest three years and countless thousands of dollars in
legal education, then hit a roadblock on the path they had charted to upward
mobility and a professional career. The exclusion disproportionately affects
the members of underrepresented and disadvantaged groups who stand to
benefit most from entry. Concurrently, the profession’s dire need to diversify
goes unaddressed, perpetuating the lack of representation and inclusion for
broad swaths of the public.
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The reasons that the legal profession advances for refusing to lower bar
exam cut scores do it little credit. Legal regulators typically defend cut scores as
measures of minimum competence, disparate racial impacts notwithstanding.
But the bar exam has never been job-validated and fails to meet the substantive
antidiscrimination standards imposed on most employment tests. This
anomaly leads some critics to suggest that racism and anticompetition are
the true drivers of heightened cut scores. More should be expected from the
profession entrusted with the rules for reducing discrimination, promoting
equity, and ensuring fairness. A common defense for retaining or raising
cut scores is that doing so prevents lawyer malfeasance. But the bar exam is
not designed to weed out unethical people. Even if it accidentally predicted
discipline, it could be inappropriate to use it for that purpose. And either way,
use of the exam distracts attention from more effective, less discriminatory
approaches, such as behavioral systems and regulations for practicing lawyers.
This paper enters this scholarly and regulatory conversation by testing
whether lawyers’ bar exam scores predict misconduct. If they do not, this would
weaken the case against lowering bar exam cut scores to promote diversity and
access to the legal profession. Importantly, the paper’s aim is not to identify
the best way to prevent lawyer misconduct; many better alternatives exist. It is
instead a paper about bar exams, lawyer discipline, and the fundamental flaws
of a particular strategy that limits diversity.
Reasonable Skepticism of Heightened Cut Scores
A robust scholarship justifies skepticism that heightened cut scores produce
less dangerous attorneys. Bar exam advocates have long flown the banner of
public protection in support of an instrument that excludes underrepresented
populations. Yet cut scores vary among jurisdictions and across time with
no apparent empirical justification. The bar exam does not even purport to
measure the traits and behaviors that most tend to result in findings of lawyer
malfeasance. Prior empirical attempts to find relationships between bar exam
performance and subsequent discipline have fared little better, given daunting
methodological challenges.
The Exclusionary Backdrop of the Bar Exam
Whether measured by word or deed, exclusion was long the animating
principle of the bar exam. At the inception of the modern, highly regulated
system of entry into the legal profession, its architects cast racial exclusion
as public protection. Consider U.S. Senator and American Bar Association
President Elihu Root, who in 1916 confronted a bar with few Black, Brown,
or female members by inveighing6 against the dangers of New York’s ethnicEuropean bar:
6

Elihu Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship 511–12, 519 (1916). Alba M.
Edwards, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940 Population Comparative
Occupation Statistics for the United States, 1870 to 1940, at 135, 165, 172 (1943).
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Fifty percent of the lawyers of this city are either foreign born or of
foreign parents. And the great mass of them have in their blood . . . the
traditions of the countries from which they came . . . . [T]his great mass
. . . will change us unless we change them.7
Root led the ABA’s efforts to erect the modern system of legal education
and licensure that culminates with the bar exam.8
Skip forward half a century, and the bar exam still operated as an engine
of exclusion. For technical reasons, the federal courts decided that Title VII’s
ban on racially discriminatory employment tests did not apply to bar exams.9
But after every single one of forty Black applicants failed the Georgia bar
exam in 1972, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected
the contention that exam passage established a “minimal competence required
to practice law.”10 Had Title VII applied, the court reasoned, the adverse racial
impact and lack of a professional validation study “would inexorably compel
the conclusion that the examination” was illegal.11
Half a century later, exclusion and lack of access remain the norm. Fewer than
15% of today’s U.S. lawyers are people of color, and low-income Americans (a
disproportionately nonwhite population) receive adequate legal assistance for
fewer than 15% of their civil legal problems.12 The ABA, NCBE, and their state
counterparts now have many programs to improve diversity and equality.13 Yet,

7

Root, supra note 6, at 479.

8

See, e.g., James P. White, Legal Education in the Era of Change: Law School Autonomy, 1987 Duke L.J.
292, 294–95.

9

See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1096
(1975).
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Tyler, 517 F.2d, at 1102, 1092 (apparently quoting the bar examiners).
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Id. at 1096.
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ABA National Lawyer Population Survey: 10-Year Trend in Lawyer Demographics: Year 2020, ABA https://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/national-lawyerpopulation-demographics-2010-2020.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2021); The Justice Gap: Measuring
the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income Americans, Legal Services Corporation, at 6 (2017),
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf.
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See, e.g., Diversity and Inclusion Center, American Bar Association, https://www.americanbar.
org/groups/diversity/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2020); Resource Center for Access to Justice Initiatives,
American Bar Association, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_
defense/resource_center_for_access_to_justice/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2020); Victor D.
Quintanilla et al., Evaluating Productive Mindset Interventions that Promote Excellence on California’s
Bar Exam, AccessLex Institute (June 25, 2020), https://mindsetsinlegaleducation.com/wpcontent/uploads/2020/10/MILE-ExecutiveSummary.pdf.
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as we have shown elsewhere,14 heightened cut scores have substantial negative
impacts on the diversity and ambit of a jurisdiction’s legal profession.15
The Cost of Exclusion
This exclusion from practice of large numbers of law school graduates who
are disproportionately people of color undermines fundamental commitments
of the legal profession: justice, service, opportunity, public legitimacy,
and fairness. Every otherwise qualified lawyer excluded from practice by a
heightened cut score is one fewer attorney available to help close the access-tojustice gap. The loss is amplified by the disparate racial impact of heightened
cut scores. Attorneys of color are more likely than their white peers to enter
work in government service, public service, or the public interest.16 They
typically also provide more services to clients of color, undertake more pro
bono work, provide more mentoring to younger attorneys, and sit on more
community organization boards.17 Given pervasive racial inequities in U.S.
life, the exclusion of aspiring attorneys of color from practice eliminates what
would otherwise be an escalator to upward mobility and a professional career.18
The legitimacy of law as a central civic and governmental institution
is at stake as well. As Justice O’Connor explained, writing for the Court
in Grutter v. Bollinger, “[I]t is necessary that the path to leadership be visibly
open to talented and qualified individuals of every race and ethnicity” if the
profession is to produce “leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.”19
14

See Deborah Jones Merritt et al., Raising the Bar: A Social Science Critique of Recent Increases to
Passing Scores on the Bar Exam, 69 U. Cin. L. Rev. 929, 929–31 (2001). On perverse incentives of
heightened cut scores for legal education, see id.; Steven C. Bahls, Standard Setting: The Impact of
Higher Standards on the Quality of Legal Education, 70 Bar Examiner 15 (2001).

15

Bar abolitionists point to these racially disparate impacts as evidence that the profession
should dispense with the bar exam altogether. See, e.g., Edward F. Bell, Do Bar Examinations
Serve a Useful Purpose? 57 Am. Bar Assoc. J. 1215 (1971). Our study is of primary relevance to a
different question: If the bar exam is to be given, should the cut score be set high?

16

Richard O. Lempert, Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law School, 25
Law & Soc. Inquiry 395 (2000).

17

Id.; Ronit Dinovitzer et al., After the JD II: Second Results from a National Study of Legal Careers, at
72–73 (2009), https://www.law.du.edu/documents/directory/publications/sterling/AJD2.
pdf; Gita Z. Wilder, Race and Ethnicity in the Legal Profession: Findings from the First Wave of the After
the JD Study, at 4–6, 15–16, 61–63 (2008); Michelle J. Anderson, Legal Education Reform, Diversity,
and Access to Justice, 61 Rutgers L. Rev. 1011, 1015–19 (2009).

18

On the increase in earnings by race associated with earning a J.D., see Frank McIntyre &
Michael Simkovic, Are Law Degrees as Valuable to Minorities, 53 Intl. Rev. L. Econ. 23 (2018).

19

539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003); see also A. Leon Higginbotham, The Case of the Missing Black Judges,
N.Y. Times (Jan. 29, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/07/29/opinion/the-case-of-themissing-black-judges.html (“Judicial homogeneity” makes “it difficult to have a court that
. . . has the respect of most segments of the population,” while “judicial pluralism breeds
judicial legitimacy”); Brief for John Conyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-2421, 02-516) (describing “core democratic values
of full and fair political participation and responsive government for minority citizens”).
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Given that a key justification for heightened cut scores is the protection of
the public, additional norms of fairness would be violated were such scores
neither designed to predict disciplinary missteps nor shown to be predictive of
sanctioned misconduct.
The Case Against Cut Scores as a Measure of Subsequent Ethicality
Choices about cut scores display little rhyme or reason. As Gary Rosin
observes, the choice of cut score “often has no empirical basis.”20 U.S.
jurisdictions apply a wide range of cut scores and find them satisfactory. Law
schools with similar scaled bar exam scores can have vastly different bar passage
rates depending on the state they are in.21 The phenomenon is particularly
striking in California, where multiple non-ABA-accredited law schools have
graduating classes with higher average scores on the Multistate Bar Exam
than the average graduate of an ABA-accredited law school in the United
States.22 But because California has a heightened cut score and other states
generally do not open their bar exams to applicants from schools accredited
only by California, many of these above-average law school graduates cannot
become lawyers.23
States regularly change their cut scores too, often for dubious reasons.24 In
the 1990s a third of states did so.25 The vast majority moved cut scores upward,
driving down bar passage rates even as applicants’ quality and diversity rose.26
Given the lack of credible explanations for raising the bar, it’s no wonder
some saw anti-competitive practices at work while a second overlapping group
20

Gary S. Rosin, Unpacking the Bar: Of Cut Scores, Competence and Crucibles, 32 J. Legal Prof. 67, 72
(2008).

21

Id. at 69.

22

William Wesley Patton, A Blueprint for a Fairer ABA Standard for Judging Law Graduates’ Competence:
How A Standard Based on Students’ Scores in Relation to the National Mean MBE Score Properly Balances
Consumer Safety with Increased Diversity in the Bar, 24 Wash. & Lee J. Civ. Rts. & Soc. Just. 3
(2017).

23

Id.; Practicing Outside California, San Joaquin College of Law, http://www.sjcl.edu/
index.php/prospective-students/why-sjcl/practicing-outside-california (last visited Dec. 31,
2021). Many states permit graduates of California accredited law schools to sit for their bar
exams if the applicant has already been admitted to practice in another jurisdiction. Id.

24

See Derek Muller, A Few Longer Thoughts on the Four Debates about the Bar Exam, Excess of
Democracy (Aug. 22, 2017), https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2017/8/a-few-longerthoughts-on-the-four-debates-about-the-bar-exam (describing how four states altered their
cut scores in 2017 and how one state planned to raise it, then delayed doing so). Compare
Stephen Klein, Setting Bar Exam Passing Scores and Standards, The Bar Examiner, Nov. 2001,
at 12 (summarizing his methodology for helping states set cut scores) with Merritt et al.,
supra note 14 (critiquing that method). Citing the lack of justification for cut scores that vary
by jurisdiction, some have suggested that we move toward a uniform cut score. Joan W.
Howarth, The Case for a Uniform Cut Score, 42 J. Legal Prof. 69 (2017).

25

Deborah Jones Merritt, Raising the Bar: Limiting Entry to the Legal Profession, 70 Bar Exam. 9, 11
n.4 (2001).

26

Id.; Merritt et al., supra note 14, at 929–30, 937–39.
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perceived racism: “Why does a group of applicants that is one-fifth nonwhite
have to show a higher level of competence than their mostly white predecessors
displayed twenty years ago?”27 Whatever the reasons, the results were stark:
Just as large numbers of talented nonwhite aspiring lawyers sought to enter
the profession, legal regulators began erecting barriers that kept many out.
A further reason to be skeptical is that the bar exam is simply not designed to
be an instrument that measures aspects of competence that would differentiate
unethical attorneys from ethical ones or screen from practice those most likely
to be disciplined. The problem is not that competence and ethics are unrelated;
it is that the bar exam is a poor measure of either. Competence is generally
understood to be the bundle of skills, attitudes, tendencies, abilities, pieces
of knowledge, and the like that make for better or worse legal practice.28 As a
practical matter, competence can be measured only in broad strokes given the
breadth and complexity of legal practice.29 Were one to seek a comprehensive
account of factors influencing success at the bar, the list might include joy, grit,
honesty, purpose, and professional pride, among others.30 Further, while it is
27

Merritt, Limiting Entry, supra note 25, at 11; Benjamin Hoorn Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers:
An Economic Analysis of the Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 429, 433
(2001); see also Bahls, supra note 14, at 17 (proposing as the “most important test--whether
practicing attorneys can pass the exam under actual exam conditions using a new cut score”).

28

Jeremy Cooper, What Is Legal Competence? 54 Modern L. Rev. 112 (1991); Maureen F. Fitzgerald,
Competence Revisited: Summary of Research on Lawyer Competence, 13 J. Prof. Legal Educ. 227
(1995); Deborah Jones Merritt & Logan Cornett, Building a Better Bar: The Twelve Building Blocks
of Minimum Competence, Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System
(Dec. 2020), https://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/documents/publications/building_a_
better_bar.pdf.

29

Cooper, supra note 28; Fitzgerald, supra note 28; Merritt & Cornett, supra note 28. Thus, a recent
report by the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System that speaks just of
the knowledge and skills necessary for the minimum professional competence necessary to
begin practice lists the capacity for professional and ethical conduct; understanding of legal
processes and sources and of threshold concepts in many subjects; identifying legal issues
and clients’ big-picture concerns; researching and interpreting law; interacting with clients,
colleagues, and others; managing and coping with workload; and self-directed learning.
Merritt & Cornett, supra note 28; see also Cooper, supra note 28 (describing an earlier ALIABA report that reached similar conclusions). With such criteria in hand, it is possible to
seek thresholds beyond which incompetence lies. This is the impulse that animates the bar
exam’s search for the minimum legal knowledge necessary for competent legal practice. See,
e.g., Bar Admissions During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Evaluating Options for the Class of 2020, NCBE, at
6 (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.ncbex.org/pdfviewer/?file=%2Fdmsdocument%2F239. Other
definitions display similar catholicism. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, supra note 28 (reviewing post-1980
research on identifying competencies comprehensively and collecting pre-1980 studies).

30

Roger C. Cramton, Lawyer Competence and the Law Schools, 4 U. Ark. Little Rock L.J. 1, 8–9
(1981). If competence were ever perfectly measured, capacity and performance would
merge. Lawyers who achieved higher scores would be superior attorneys. Those judged
incompetent would perform below minimum standards, Fitzgerald, supra note 28, at 248;
Cooper, supra note 28, at 113–14, and thereby frequently violate ethical standards, given that
the Rules of Professional Conduct demand minimum standards of performance, see, e.g.,
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct §§ 1.1, 1.3. Such precise, predictive measurement
is impossible, of course.
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often assumed that state bar disciplinary actions are based largely on a lack of
legal knowledge, the underlying reality is that the largest category of state bar
discipline actions involve a failing of lawyering skills, including poor attorneyclient relations, poor communication skills, and neglect of clients’ matters or
lack of diligence; however, as currently designed, the bar exam tests primarily
the memorization of subject matter knowledge, analysis, and recall under time
pressure.31 That is, the bar exam is simply not designed to measure the kind of
professionalism writ large or ethical behavior in particular that leads to client
dissatisfaction and complaints.
But even if the choice of a heightened cut score coincidentally and weakly
predicts discipline years into the future, it would still be unjust to use it for
that purpose. Indeed, this is a major reason that other predictive factors are
not similarly invoked to block people from the profession. Leslie Levin and
colleagues illustrate just this lesson when they show how character and fitness
investigations collect predictors of subsequent discipline that are not used
as reasons to deny permission to practice.32 For instance, applicants report
whether they are men and whether they have previously defaulted on a student
loan. Both groups are more likely to be disciplined than women and those
with no history of default.33 Yet no one would dream of barring men from
the profession, and even those who have defaulted on loans are permitted to
practice law if otherwise qualified.34 The relative infrequency of disciplinary
31

Randall Kiser, Soft Skills for the Effective Lawyer (2017) (compiling data from attorney
registration and disciplinary reports in Illinois, Washington State, Utah, Wisconsin, and
California). See also Anita Bernstein, What Clients Want, What Lawyers Need, 52 Emory L.J. 1053
(2003); Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Liana G. T. Wolf, The Paradox and Promise of Restorative
Attorney Discipline, 12 Nevada L. J. 253 (2012) (The “most common complaints against lawyers
include a failure to communicate with the client and neglect of the client’s matters.”). On
what the bar exam tests and on actual causes of lawyer discipline, see Judith Welch Wegner,
Contemplating Competence: Three Meditations, 50 Val. U. L. Rev. 675, 714 (2016); Susan R. Martyn,
Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar, 69 Georgetown L.J. 705, 723 (1981);
Norman Krivosha, Lawyer Competence from Another Perspective, 68 Am. Bar Assoc. J. 828, 828–
29 (1982); Cramton, supra note 30, at 7–9; Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline
Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation? 1974 U. Ill. L.F. 193, 212 (1973) (finding that lawyer
neglect was the principal complaint filed by clients with an attorney grievance committee).
But see Jeffrey S. Kinsler, Is Bar Exam Failure a Harbinger of Professional Discipline? 92 St. John’s L.
Rev. 883, 884–91 (2017) (hypothesizing that bar exam failure is a good measure of traits that
it is not designed to test: lack of diligence and incompetent performance). Conversely, the
bar exam omits measurement of many traits and behaviors that are central to professional
success. See Marjorie M. Shultz & Sheldon Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the
Basis for Law School Admission Decisions, 36 Law & Soc. Inquiry 620, 625 (2011).

32

Leslie C. Levin et al., A Study of the relationship Between Bar Admissions Data and
Subsequent Lawyer Discipline 1 (Mar. 15, 2013), https://perma.cc/97RX-GYQK; Leslie
C. Levin et al., The Questionable Character of the Bar’s Character and Fitness Inquiry, 40 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 51 (2015).

33

Levin et al., supra note 32; Deborah J. Merritt, Bar Exam Scores and Lawyer Discipline,
Law School Cafe (June 3, 2017), https://www.lawschoolcafe.org/2017/06/03/
bar-exam-scores-and-lawyer-discipline/.
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Levin et al., supra note 32; Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33.
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measures imposed within the legal profession helps explain why even these
statistically significant predictors of subsequent discipline are not grounds for
action: They lack a meaningful effect size.35 Another reason is the general rule
that bad acts are proper bases of punishment, but that group-based correlates
are not.36 Aspiring lawyers who fall just short of newly heightened cut scores
can with equal force claim that through hard work, money invested, expertise
attained, and forgone opportunities, they have earned the opportunity to
practice.
The unfairness of heightened cut scores is exacerbated because they often
represent daunting and unequally distributed barriers to entry. Like other
high-stakes tests such as the SAT, GRE, and LSAT, the bar exam reproduces
and compounds discrimination by disproportionately excluding members of
racial and ethnic minority groups.37 High-stakes exams are typically offered in
contexts that raise worries among many test-takers of negatively stereotyped
groups that their underperformance would confirm negative stereotypes
about the intellectual capacity of the groups to which they belong. This
“stereotype threat” disproportionately burdens test-takers of color.38 As we
have shown in other work, legal education is also rife with high-stress, lowbelonging, fixed-mindset contexts that particularly harm aspiring lawyers of
color.39 Add to that the enormous debt owed to U.S. communities of color
who continue to be systematically denied access to education, well-paying
jobs, sociopolitical participation, and other essential resources for success.40
The result is a profession that is missing an opportunity to promote diversity,
equity, inclusion, and access to justice out of suspicion toward aspirants who
35

Levin et al., supra note 32.

36

Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33.

37

Kelly Ochs Rosinger et al., The Role of Selective College Admissions Criteria in Interrupting or Reproducing
Racial and Economic Inequities, 92 J. Higher Educ. 31 (2020); Casey W. Miller et al., Typical
physics Ph.D. admissions criteria limit access to underrepresented groups but fail to predict doctoral completion,
5 Science Advances 7550 (2019), https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.aat7550; Aaron
N. Taylor, The Marginalization of Black Aspiring Lawyers, 13 FIU L. Rev. 489 (2019); Case Miller &
Keivan Stassun, A Test That Fails, 510 Nature 303 (2014).

38

See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of
African Americans, 69 J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 797 (1995); Sian L. Beilock et al., Stereotype threat
and working memory: Mechanisms, alleviation, and spillover, 136 J. Experimental Psychol. 256
(2007); Toni Schmader et al., An Integrated Process Model of Stereotype Threat Effects on Performance,
115 Psychol. Rev. 336 (2008); Steven Spencer et al., Stereotype Threat, 67 Ann. Rev. Psychol.
415 (2016).

39

Dorainne J. Green et al., Group-Based Inequalities in Relationships in Law School Predict Disparities
in Belonging, Satisfaction, and Achievement in Law School, __ J. Educ. Psych. ___ (forthcoming);
Victor D. Quintanilla & Sam Erman, Mindsets in Legal Education, J. Legal Educ. (forthcoming
2021). Studying for the bar exam involves many costs, including expensive bar preparation
courses, large investments of time, and powerful psychological headwinds. All of these
could be mitigated by lower cut scores.

40

Gloria Ladson-Billings, From the Achievement Gap to the Education Debt: Understanding Achievement in
U.S. Schools, 35 Educational Researcher 3 (2006).
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have otherwise proved themselves by successfully graduating from a college
or university, by matriculating into law school, by fulfilling all graduation
requirements and in many cases by engaging in some sort of legal work in
a supervised setting, whether in a law school clinic, externship, or clerkship.
Empirical Challenges to Studying Lawyer Discipline
Prior empirical attempts to establish whether heightened cut scores reduce
rates of ethical lapses among lawyers have faced four noteworthy challenges:
data shortcomings, lag times, unobserved distribution, and proxies that may
be confounding variables. The data problem arises because most scholars
base their analyses on the disciplinary statistics that legal regulators maintain
and that the ABA aggregates: complaints, charges, and discipline against
attorneys.41
There are compelling reasons to use this data. The information is accessible,
can be compared across jurisdictions, and reflects the judgment of the
profession as to what counts as objectionable.42 Indeed, this study uses this
data because there is, in fact, no better data for this investigation. Like most
data, however, it presents challenges. Given consumers’ lack of legal training,43
their complaints may reflect deficits in lawyers’ social skills more closely than
they do lawyers’ performance at legal tasks.44 Charging decisions that do not
result in discipline are noisy signals. Even discipline decisions are heavily
mediated by who complains, by the state’s investigatory capacity, and by the
types of failings subject to discipline.45 The degree of influence these issues
have is unclear. Such problems are not unique to this study and will persist in
all future studies using this data so long as oversight improvements, funding
for a robust investigative capacity, and a willingness to discipline the full range
of lawyerly incompetence are not forthcoming. A profession committed to
improving lawyer competence and deterring incompetence would not rely on
the bar exam when it can assess for itself, through more careful monitoring,
when misconduct is actually taking place.

41

Robert Anderson & Derek T. Muller, The High Cost of Lowering the Bar, 32 Georgetown J. Leg.
Ethics 307 (2017); Kinsler, supra note 31; Levin et al., supra note 32; Levin et al., supra note 32.

42

See, e.g., Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems 2018, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/resources/surveyonlawyerdisciplinesystems2014/ (last visited
Dec. 31, 2021).

43

Cooper, supra note 28, at 116–17.

44

A related literature in the medical context finds that doctor apologies reduce the risk of
malpractice litigation. See, e.g., Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, Does Sorry Work? The Impact of Apology
Laws on Medical Malpractice, 43 J. Risk & Uncertainty 141 (2011).

45

Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33; Charts VII, IX, in ABA, supra note 42; Jurisdictional Rules
Comparison Charts, ABA, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/
policy/rule_charts/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
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Lag presents another problem, because discipline of lawyers during their
first ten years of practice is rare.46 Indeed, rates of discipline accumulate so
slowly such that by the thirty-fifth year of practice only 5% of lawyers have faced
some form of discipline; 95% of lawyers retain spotless disciplinary records.47
Any systematic causal link between cut scores and discipline would require that
bar exam underperformance prior to starting practice predicted misconduct
into the twilight of a professional’s career—as if marginal bar performance
detonated some sort of intergenerational time bomb derailing attorneys guilty
of no measured damage for upwards of three decades.48
Jeffrey Kinsler sought to address the problems of lag between bar passage
and discipline by focusing on the relationship that he found between prior bar
exam failure and early-career malfeasance in Tennessee.49 But his examination
of discipline in 2005-2016 of lawyers who had passed the bar in 2005-2014
identified just fourteen attorneys who had both previously failed the exam and
subsequently received discipline—hardly a crisis demanding a response.50
Tennessee’s cut score was generally well below the national median when this
non-crisis occurred.51 Because such early-career discipline is quite unusual, it
is also unclear what lessons can be drawn for the larger problem of later-career
disciplinary infractions.
A third problem is that intrajurisdiction studies can examine only the
discipline rates of lawyers who pass the bar exam, which at best, renders
speculative any conclusions about those who would have passed the exam at

46

Anderson & Muller, supra note 41; Kinsler, supra note 31; Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33.

47

Anderson & Muller, supra note 41.

48

See Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33.

49

Kinsler, supra note 31.

50

Id. Fourteen is not reported, but can be calculated from the following reported data:
7256 lawyers passed the Tennessee bar exam during the relevant period; 69 of them were
disciplined during the period, 281 of the lawyers who passed during the period failed the
bar more than twice; 8.37% of those who passed, did so on the second attempt; 87.76% did
so on the first attempt; among those who passed on the first attempt, the discipline rate was
0.864%. Id., at 894, 897. The approach means that the reported discipline rates have more
digits of accuracy than does the population of those disciplined.
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Tennessee had a cut score of 1250 through 2010, and a cut score of 1350 beginning in
2011. National Conference of Bar Examiners and American Bar Association Section of
Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admissions
Requirements [2000-2014] (2000-2014). The median cut score used by states during these
years was 135, except that before 2011 the median was sometimes a point or two lower. Id.
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a lower cut score.52 Changing a cut score may also alter how people study for
the bar exam and thus how they perform on it.53
Finally, some studies use proxies for bar exam scores: prior bar exam failure
or law school rank.54 But law school rank, rather than bar exam performance,
is probably driving the result in both cases. Whereas the bar exam is not
designed to measure the traits most associated with lawyer discipline, one’s law
school influences one’s career trajectory in ways that shape one’s susceptibility
to subsequent discipline.55 Unlike bar exam scores, one’s law school appears
prominently on one’s resume and so provides a ready basis for discrimination.
Unsurprisingly, graduates of higher-ranked law schools are more likely than
graduates of lower-ranked ones to secure coveted big-firm jobs and slots in
prosecutors’ offices.56 Graduates of lower-ranked schools are overrepresented
in small and solo firms, where over 90% of disciplinary sanctions are imposed.57
52

See Derek Muller, High-level implications: California Supreme Court reduces bar exam cut score from 144
to 139, Excess of Democracy (July 16, 2020), https://excessofdemocracy.com/blog/2020/7/
high-level-implications-california-supreme-court-reduces-bar-exam-cut-score-from-144to-139 (issuing a down-to-the-percentage-point prediction as to the lifetime discipline rates
of those attorneys who will be admitted to the California bar as a result of the cut score being
lowered from 1440 to 1390).

53

Muller sidesteps such concerns with the predicated “all else being equal.” Id.
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Anderson & Muller, supra note 41 (using law school as a proxy for LSAT score as a proxy
for MBE score as a proxy for overall bar exam score); Levin et al., supra note 32, at 21, 28;
Kinsler, supra note 31; Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33. Anderson & Muller, supra note
41, also identifies a relationship between taking the bar in February and being subject to
discipline subsequently. This result, which matches what other researchers have found, see
Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33, is largely derivative of the relationships between law
school rank and subsequent discipline and between having repeated the bar exam prior
to passage and subsequent passage. Students at lower-ranked law schools are more likely
to engage in part-time study and thus more likely to graduate and to take the bar exam
off-cycle. See 2009-2013 Total Part-Time JD Enrollment by Gender and Ethnicity, ABA, https://www.
americanbar.org/groups/legal_education/resources/statistics/statistics-archives/
(last
visited Feb. 11, 2021); compare, e.g., General Statistics Report July 2019 California Bar Examination,
State Bar of California, at 1 (Dec. 20, 2019), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/
documents/July2019-CBX-Statistics.pdf? [hereinafter July 2019 Cal. Bar Stats], with General
Statistics Report February 2020 California Bar Examination, State Bar of California, at 1 (June
26, 2020), https://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/FEB2020-CBX-Statistics.pdf
[hereinafter Feb. 2020 Cal. Bar Stats]. Most people who fail the bar exam first take it in July,
so repeaters are disproportionately present in February. Compare, e.g., July 2019 Cal. Bar Stats,
supra note 54, with February 2020 Cal. Bar Stats, supra note 54.
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Levin et al., supra note 32; Levin et al., supra note 32.
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Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33; Levin et al., supra note 32, at 29.
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Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33; see also William Wesley Patton, A Rebuttal to Kinsler’s
and to Anderson and Muller’s Studies on the Purported Relationship Between Bar Passage Rates and Attorney
Discipline, 93 St. John’s L. Rev. 43 (2019); Levin et al., supra note 32, at 29; Levin et al., supra
note 32, at 56. Indeed, this relationship is part of a self-reinforcing cycle of disadvantage.
Top-tier law schools primarily enroll advantaged students. Lower-tier law schools enroll
many more members of disadvantaged groups. Then, the mostly advantaged students
from top-tier law schools get routed into firm jobs and prosecutors’ offices, where formal
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Lower rates of discipline of big-firm lawyers and prosecutors may have
more to do with the nature of their practice than with their competence upon
entering into legal practice. Many law firms and prosecutor’s offices leverage
and reinforce their elite status by ensuring that their attorneys’ malfeasance
does not result in complaints, charges, or discipline.58 Law firms cultivate
repeat-player clients who consequently have more opportunities to settle
disputes bilaterally.59 Larger firms also have the resources to create ethical
infrastructure, which reduces neglect and associated complaints.60 Similarly,
though prosecutorial misconduct is rampant in some jurisdictions, friendly
doctrines and power imbalances generally guarantee impunity.61
The nature of solo and small-firm practice also explains why lawyers in such
practices receive more complaints (and the charges and discipline that follow).
Many lack adequate office support, which can lead to neglect of client matters
and failures to return phone calls.62 Such lawyers also occupy lower-status
niches in the legal profession, making them subject to legal regulators’ bias.63
Their practices involve more one-off, personal-plight representations with
vulnerable and emotionally invested clients who have little recourse outside
the disciplinary process.64 Though lawyers at smaller practices are more likely
to have cash flow problems and greater personal control over client funds, they
do not disproportionately steal from client funds or engage in similarly serious
misconduct.65
An irony lurks here. The broad policy question to be answered is whether
the gains in the diversity, inclusion, representation, and capacity of the legal
profession that would flow from lower cut scores will benefit the public
overall. A common dissenting claim is that lowering cut scores could result in
dramatically higher rates of discipline, hence diminishing public protection.
Studying just that question tends to focus public attention on speculative
and, at most, modest harms of lowering cut scores rather than on its large,
demonstrable benefits. Such temporary blinders might be justified if they
sharpened the part of the inquiry that was their focus. Instead, the effect has
been to distort without clarifying.
discipline rarely lies. Lawyers from disadvantaged groups tend to hail from lower-ranked law
schools, whom the profession routes into the small and solo firms upon whose attorneys the
professional imposes nearly all its discipline. See Taylor, supra note 37.
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Patton, supra note 57.
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Levin et al., supra note 32; David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L. Rev.
801 (1992).
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Levin et al., supra note 32, at 56; Patton, supra note 57.
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Patton, supra note 57.
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Id.; Levin et al., supra note 32, at 29, 37; Levin et al., supra note 32, at 56.
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Levin et al., supra note 32, at 56; Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33.
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Levin et al., supra note 32.

65

Merritt, Bar Exam Scores, supra note 33; Levin et al., supra note 32, at 29, 37.
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Current Study
The current study set out to evaluate the extent to which the cut score
used as the passing score of the bar exam corresponds to improvement in a
variety of public protection measures. We hypothesize that higher bar exam
cut scores will be inert with respect to (1) decreasing the number of complaints
filed against attorneys by the public, (2) decreasing the number of charges
filed against attorneys, and (3) decreasing the number of disciplinary actions
taken against attorneys. Said another way, we predict that there will be no
evidence suggesting that higher cut scores produce fewer complaints, charges,
and disciplinary actions against attorneys. To evaluate our hypotheses, we
employed statistical modeling to the combined disciplinary records from the
American Bar Association (ABA) and states’ cut scores from 2013 to 2018.
Methods
Sample
Disciplinary data, which consists of complaints brought by the public
against attorneys, charges filed after probable cause, disciplinary actions taken
against attorneys (henceforth collectively referred to as public protection
data), and the number of active attorneys, are derived from the Survey on
Lawyer Discipline Systems (SOLD), administered and maintained by the
ABA’s Center for Professional Responsibility. According to the ABA, SOLD
data is intended to educate the public, the profession, the news media, courts,
and disciplinary agencies about sanctions imposed, caseload, budget, and
staffing activities in each jurisdiction.
We collected the number of complaints filed, charges filed, disciplinary
actions, and the number of active attorneys for each available state from 2013
until the most recent SOLD year of 2018. These multijurisdictional records
come from up to forty-eight U.S. jurisdictions, with the precise number of
states reporting to the ABA varying by year. Additionally, several states were
not accounted for in these ABA reports for particular years. In pursuit of
exhaustive analyses, we gathered discipline data for these states from official
reports on their respective state websites. These supplemental states were
California 2013-2018, Massachusetts 2016-2017, Missouri 2013, Montana 2017,
Nevada 2015-2016, New Hampshire 2013, Ohio 2014, and South Carolina 2013
and 2017. For future analyses, we refer to these as supplemental states.
All public protection measures were converted into counts per 1000
attorneys by multiplying the total incidences by 1000 and dividing by the
number of attorneys. For example, Alabama had 13,754 active attorneys in
2016 and 1149 complaints received by a disciplinary agency. This is converted
to (1149 x 1000)/13,754 = 83.5 complaints per 1000 attorneys. These modified
variables were used as outcomes in statistical analyses.
Our cut score data consists of every state’s minimum passing bar exam
score dating from 2013-2018. Since 1994, the NCBE has released annual
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comprehensive guides to bar admission requirements, which report the
minimum passing score for each state. We have compiled these reports to
determine the minimum bar exam cut score required for licensure by each
state between 2013 and 2018.
Measures
a. Complaints Brought by the Public Against Attorneys
We used the SOLD’s records of complaints received each year by the
state’s disciplinary agency. Per the ABA, complaints include any information
received by the disciplinary agency regarding lawyer conduct that requires a
determination as to whether the disciplinary agency has jurisdiction over the
lawyer or matter(s) complained of, or whether sufficient facts are alleged that
would, if true, constitute misconduct. Notably, if complaints were handled
separately by a central intake or consumer assistance program, they were not
counted in our measure. Complaint counts from central intake or consumer
assistance programs were unavailable for most states, even those that reported
the use of such programs. Additionally, the SOLD reports complaints pending
from prior years, complaints summarily dismissed or screened out, complaints
investigated, and complaints dismissed after investigation. Because these
additional measures imply action taken on complaints, we felt they were
unrelated to the posited relationship between cut score and complaints filed,
and thereby chose to discard this additional data.
b. Charges Filed After Probable Cause
Our use of charges corresponds to the SOLD’s record of lawyers charged
after probable cause determination. The ABA defines charges this way:
After a determination has been made that there is probable cause to
believe that misconduct occurred, any document, pleading or notice filed
by the disciplinary agency or appropriate authority with the designated
adjudicatory tribunal, wherein a lawyer is charged with specified acts
of misconduct and violations of the rules of professional conduct and a
disciplinary sanction is sought.
We collected the number of charges for each state per year. Notably, charges
are not a prerequisite for discipline in all states, and thus some cases arise
in which the number of disciplinary actions is greater than the number of
charges.
c. Disciplinary Action
Disciplinary action consisted of two types: private and public. Private
discipline includes action such as admonition, reprimand, or letter of warning/
caution. Public discipline includes involuntary disbarment, disbarment on
consent, suspension (excluding interim suspension), interim suspension (for
risk of harm or criminal conviction), admonishment, reprimand, censure,
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probation, an order to pay restitution, or an order to pay costs. The SOLD
provides the overall number of public and private disciplinary actions taken
for each state each year, in addition to the total number for each specific
disciplinary measure.
Arizona, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, Maryland,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, and West Virginia do not have
a public/private distinction. In these cases, data was listed as only public
discipline (i.e., no private discipline was indicated). Additionally, SOLD
records included notes from some states indicating, for example, that letters
of caution or warning are not considered disciplinary actions. The full set of
notes are relatively few and can be reviewed in the ABA’s official SOLD report.
We have accounted for these details in our series of analyses.
We harnessed the total number of public and private disciplinary actions
taken against attorneys as our primary outcome measure. That is, we summed
the total number of private and public disciplinary actions provided by the
SOLD.66 Just as with the other outcome measures, we converted this outcome
to total disciplinary actions per 1000 attorneys. As a secondary set of analyses,
we also looked at each specific disciplinary outcome (e.g., disbarment) with
and without data that included states’ notes as caveats.
Data Analysis Plan
Given the research questions’ emphasis on generic relationships between
bar exam cut scores and complaints, charges, and disciplinary actions taken
against attorneys, we took a multimodal approach to data analysis that would
allow us to uncover different ways in which these variables may relate to one
another. Between 2013 and 2018, each state would provide annual counts
for each public protection measure, totaling approximately 275 observations
across this time window (the actual number will vary by outcome and analytic
approach; e.g., see Table 1). First, we used linear regression to explore the
relationship between cut scores and public protection measures. Second, we
aggregated the data by taking the mean for each state and reanalyzed the
data using linear regression. This was done to remove state-related variation
from the data and to examine relationships between only cut scores and
disciplinary averages. Third, we applied multilevel modeling to control for
within-state variation. Collectively, these methods offer a more comprehensive
look at the relationships between cut score and attorney discipline than any
single approach could offer, and therefore, our analysis allows for more robust
statements to be made concerning their relations.67 A description of these
66

See Am. Bar Assoc., Past ABA Surveys on Lawyer Discipline Systems (S.O.L.D.), https://

www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_resp onsibility/resources/
historicalabasoldsurveys/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2022) (columns 10 and 11 of the SOLD
annual report).

67

Additional models were fit to this data but are not reported here. Most notably, we fit
polynomial (quadratic and cubic) models to the data but chose to omit them from the report
for three reasons. First, our primary aim was to evaluate the claim that higher cut scores
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methods and complete set of results is provided in the appendix. Because the
findings are consistent and some models can be unnecessarily technical, we
report only the results of the linear regression in the body of the manuscript.
In the sections that follow, we highlight some additional details of the data
accounted for by our models.
Supplemental States
We acknowledge that there are sixteen supplemental state-year observations
(see sample subsection) from which data was collected from official reports on
state websites rather than the SOLD. It is understandable to suspect that this
data may function in ways inconsistent with the SOLD by virtue of allowing
different levels of reporting, applying alternative definitions, or through some
other form of variation. As such, these observations have been flagged in
the dataset. All models have been run with and without these observations,
including the identification of and filtering of new outliers based on changes
in sample size. Because this had no impact on the overall findings, we report
only on the analyses inclusive of these supplemental states, and include these
additional tests in supplemental materials available online.
Annotated Disciplinary Actions
As noted above, what is categorized as public, private, and/or disciplinary
varies by state (see the SOLD for details). Accordingly, what gets factored
into the total number of disciplinary actions (private, public, or collective)
is affected by states’ decisions. We have accounted for these nuances by
analyzing the data in several ways. First, we analyze the collective total of
public and private disciplinary actions taken against attorneys as determined
by the ABA and produced in the SOLD report. This we take as our primary
analysis of the discipline data and describe our results below. Next, we analyze
every particular public and private disciplinary measure separately, ignoring
the nuances detailed in states’ notes, thereby treating the annotated data as
equivalent to the unannotated data. This assumes that states’ differences do
not constitute meaningful departures from other states’ reports. Finally, we
discard all annotated data and analyze only data from states that do not report
annotated disciplinary outcomes. This treatment assumes that the annotated
data differs from the unannotated data in an important way that might influence
the findings. It also assumes that states providing unannotated data do not
differ from one another in important ways. Ultimately these decisions had
no bearing on the broader results. Moreover, we take the analysis of specific
increase public protection by decreasing the volume of complaints, charges, and discipline.
Quadratic and cubic fits allow this relationship to wax and wane, thereby obscuring our
ability to address this aim. Second, in most cases the quadratic and cubic fits showed little
improvement to the explained variance, which was maximized at around 8%. Third, visually
these fits appeared to overfit the data. Without a validation dataset to confirm these fits,
endorsement of overfitted models could suggest spurious conclusions. By focusing on the
three models identified in this manuscript, we feel we have remained focused on the research
question.
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disciplinary actions to be secondary to the overall research aims. Given these
two approaches, the results section includes only the analyses of the collective
total of public and private disciplinary measures provided by the SOLD. We
revisit these secondary analyses in the subsequent discussion.
Results
As noted, the data have been analyzed using a variety of statistical
techniques and with multiple inclusion/exclusion criteria. For brevity, we
narrate only the linear regression models that exclude outliers and include
the supplemental states. We feel that these offer a set of analyses that is
both reliable and approachable. As indicated throughout the results section,
however, these decisions had no relevant impact on our findings. For model
results from analyses including outliers and/or excluding supplemental states,
please review our open science repository dedicated to these findings. This
repository also includes consistent findings from the aggregated and multilevel
regression models (see appendix). Further, we include data, R code, and
analyses of secondary disciplinary outcomes in accordance with transparency,
open science, and best practices.68 Statistical significance was indicated by
p-values less 0.05 (conventional); strength of the relationship between cut
score and public protection measures was assessed by R-squared values.
Summary of Findings
Our study found no compelling evidence of a meaningful significant
negative69 relationship between states’ selection of a minimum passing bar
exam cut score and the number of complaints, charges, or disciplinary actions
taken per 1000 attorneys. Said another way, we found no evidence that higher
bar exam cut scores produce fewer complaints, charges, or disciplinary actions.
These results held across all public protection outcomes, statistical modeling
approaches, and decisions made pertaining to data treatment (e.g., inclusion
or exclusion of outliers, supplemental states, and annotated disciplinary data).
Collectively, these combined approaches searching for statistical relationships
consist of over 100 statistical models.
68

Maxwell Hong & Ann Moran, An Introduction to Open Science: How to Incorporate Best Practices into
Your Research, American Psychological Association (Feb. 2019), https://www.apa.org/
science/about/psa/2019/02/open-science.
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We define “negative” on the basis of the sign (positive or negative) of the regression coefficient
of a statistical model. A negative relationship would reflect that as cut scores increase,
complaints, charges, and/or disciplinary actions would decrease. Statistical significance is
ascribed whenever the p-value of this coefficient is < 0.05, indicating that the probability
that this relationship is found by mere chance is less than 5%. We assess meaningfulness by
the strength of the relationship between the cut score and outcome measure, as determined
by R-squared, i.e. the percentage of variance explained in the outcome by the cut score.
Across all models, the largest R-squared is .07, or 7% of variance explained. We provide
the R-squared statistic whenever the regression coefficient is statistically significant, but
otherwise classify 7% (or less) of variance explained as trivial and not meaningful toward
identifying a relationship between cut score and public accountability.
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Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics (e.g., mean and standard deviation) for each analytical
sample vary depending on both the statistical method (e.g., linear regression
or multilevel modeling) and the outcome of analysis (e.g., complaints or
charges). Starting with complaints, both the linear regression and multilevel
model identified the same set of outliers, and thus have equivalent fit statistics.
This includes a mean of 74.15 complaints per 1000 attorneys (SD = 32.8)
calculated from 273 observations (N = 273). Taking the mean across years 20132018, forty-six states (N = 46) are represented in the aggregated regression
analysis. The mean number of complaints per 1000 attorneys across these fortysix states was 73.7 (SD = 29.3). For charges, the linear regression analysis used
270 observations (N = 270), with a mean number of 3.1 charges (SD = 2.55) per
1000 attorneys. Multilevel modeling identified many additional outliers, thus
reducing the number of observations to 248 (N = 248). This analytic sample
had a mean of 2.9 charges (SD = 1.6) per 1000 attorneys. Aggregating over the
2013-2018, forty-seven states (N = 47) are represented, with a mean of 3.25 (SD
= 2.3) charges per 1000 attorneys. Finally, the analytic sample for the linear
regression models on disciplinary action contained 270 observations (N = 270),
with a mean of 4.8 disciplinary actions (SD = 3.3) taken per 1000 attorneys.
Multilevel modeling for disciplinary action also identified many additional
outliers, leaving an analytic sample size of 258 (N = 258). The mean of this
sample was 4.32 disciplinary actions (SD = 2.4) taken per 1000 attorneys. After
averaging across 2013-2018, forty-seven states (N = 47) were represented for the
aggregated analyses. These states had a mean of 4.8 disciplinary actions taken
per 1000 attorneys (SD = 2.9). Descriptive statistics for these analytic samples
are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics by analytic method and outcome variable
Analytic
Method
OLS
Regression

Aggregated
Regression

Multilevel
Modeling

Outcome
Variable

Mean
(per 1000
attorneys)

SD

SE

N

Complaints

74.15

32.81

1.99

273

Charges

3.10

2.55

0.16

270

Discipline

4.79

3.27

0.20

273

Complaints

73.69

29.33

4.32

46

Charges

3.25

2.28

0.33

47

Discipline

4.84

2.91

0.42

47

Complaints

74.15

32.81

1.99

273

Charges

4.84

1.64

0.10

270

Discipline

4.32

2.36

0.15

258
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Regression Analyses
a. Linear Regression
Beginning with the OLS regression models, we found no statistical evidence
suggesting a meaningful negative relationship between states’ bar exam cut
score and public protection outcomes. All statistically significant relationships
found were positive, though the highest R-squared value was .034, suggesting
that only 3.4% of the variance in the outcome was explained. What this may
mean is that, contrary to the conventional assumption that lower cut scores are
associated with more complaints and discipline in a jurisdiction, the converse
may be true—higher cut scores may be associated with more complaints and
discipline in a jurisdiction, not less. Even so, we consider this to be a very
weak relationship, if not altogether spurious, and thus choose not to draw any
inferences from or build discussion around these findings.
Specific findings were as follows. The relationship between states’ cut
scores and the number of complaints filed per 1000 attorneys was significant
and positive, but weak (b = 1.95, p < .01, R2 = .037). The relationship between cut
score and the number of charges filed after probable cause per 1000 attorneys
was similarly positive, statistically significant and weak (b = 0.15, p < .01, R2 =
0.035). Both relationships hold whenever supplemental states are excluded.
Including outliers eliminates all significant relationships, with or without
supplemental states. OLS regression found no relationship between the
number of disciplinary actions filed against attorneys and states’ bar exam cut
scores (b = 0.00, p = 0.96, R2 = 0.00). This held true independent of inclusion
or omission of outliers, and/or inclusion or omission of supplemental states.
Results for OLS regression models are summarized below in Table 2. We also
visualize the relationship between bar exam cut scores, complaints per 1000
attorneys, charges per 1000 attorneys, and discipline per 1000 attorneys in
Figures 1-3, respectively.
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Table 2. Results of OLS regression for public protection outcomes
Dependent Variable
Complaints per
1000 (SE)

Charges per
1000 (SE)

Discipline per
1000 (SE)

1.95***

0.15***

-0.0004

(0.61)

(0.05)

(0.06)

-189.04**

-16.83***

4.84

(81.52)

(6.35)

(8.28)

Observations

273

270

273

R

0.037

0.035

0.000

Adjusted R2

0.034

0.032

-0.004

Residual Std. Error

32.25 (df = 271)

2.51 (df = 268)

3.27 (df = 271)

Cut Score
Constant

2

F-Statistic

10.43*** (df = 1; 271) 9.85*** (df = 1; 268) 0.000 (df = 1; 271)

Note:

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

Figure 1. Complaints per 1000 Lawyers by Cut Score 2013-2018
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Figure 2. Charges per 1000 Lawyers by Cut Score 2013-2018

Figure 3. Total Disciplinary Actions per 1000 Lawyers by Cut Score 2013-2018

Summary of Other Statistical Models
To check the robustness of our findings, we contrasted the results from
our linear regression models with alternative modeling approaches. The
approaches include averaging across all time points for each state, using
multilevel modeling to account for unique state effects, and incorporating
lag in our models by which we used state cut scores eight to thirteen years
prior to complaints, charges, and discipline. A detailed account of these
methodological approaches and findings can be found in the appendix
and in the open science repository associated with this manuscript. In
summary, alternative approaches found no meaningfully significant negative
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relationships between states’ minimum passing bar exam cut scores and public
protection measures. Rather, fewer statistically significant relationships were
found than in the linear regression models and in fact those that were found
were only marginally significant, if at all. These relationships were consistently
weak and positive wherever present, thereby suggesting that if a relationship
between cut scores and public protection were to exist, it is more likely that
complaints, charges, and discipline would increase with higher cut scores.
Discussion
The choice of a cut score on the bar exam is also a choice about the size
and diversity of the profession. Lower cut scores would provide the public
greater access to a more representative set of lawyers. But perhaps costs exist
that some believe would outweigh these benefits. Certainly, existing cut scores
are often defended as instruments for public protection. Our analyses explore
whether lower cut scores would result in higher rates of discipline per lawyer
on the basis of the metrics chosen by legal regulators and the ABA. We find no
evidence to support such an assertion.
Descriptive and Statistical Findings
Three main takeaways emerge from our analyses. First, results suggest that
the mean number of complaints is approximately 74 per 1000 attorneys (see
Table 1). For charges, the mean shrinks to around 4 per 1000 attorneys, and
roughly 4.6 per 1000 attorneys for discipline. While variability among states
is expected, these averages suggest that the overall number of attorneys with
complaints, charges, and disciplinary actions taken against them is quite small
in relation to the overall population of attorneys. Said another way, between
2013 and 2018 fewer than 10% of attorneys had complaints filed against them
(7.4%, to be exact), and fewer than half a percent faced charges or disciplinary
action (0.4% and 0.46%, respectively). With so few cases, even the best prepractice predictors of subsequent discipline would, at best, be weak.70 Second,
statistical models consistently fail to find a meaningful statistically significant
negative relationship between cut scores and public protection measures. That
is, taken together these linear regression models and alternative modeling
approaches do not support the hypothesis that a negative relationship exists
between cut scores and public protection measures. Instead, the majority of
these statistical models fail to reject the null hypothesis that the relationship
between cut score and public protection is zero. Third, whenever these
relationships are statistically significant (though weak and with small effect
sizes), they are almost always in the positive direction, which would imply
heightened cut scores in fact correspond with more complaints, charges, and/or
discipline. The most robust of these findings—those from multilevel modeling
(see appendix)—suggest no significant relationship at all (but nevertheless a
positive trendline).
70

See Levin et al., supra note 32 (so finding).
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Taken together, the findings fail to support the claim that higher bar exam
cut scores correspond to greater public protection. If anything, statistical
evidence points in the opposite direction: Higher bar exam cut scores may
lead to less public protection. These general findings remain consistent even
across numerous statistical modeling approaches, controlling for state-level
peculiarities via multilevel modeling, modifying inclusion/exclusion criteria,
and as discussed below, analyses of specific disciplinary actions. Not only
is there no evidence of a significant negative relationship between cut score
and public protection, this empirical study reveals that the phenomenon at
issue involves a small minority of the profession who experience public or
private discipline to begin with. This minority is by all statistical reasoning
unaffected by the choice of bar exam cut score, and evidently unaffected in
the way proponents of higher cut scores contend. Consequently, we reject on
the basis of no supporting evidence the argument that heightened bar exam
cut scores increase public protection. Indeed, their empirically demonstrated
effect is to reduce diversity and inclusion within the legal profession with no
apparent corresponding benefit. The policy prescription is worse than the
alleged disease—and ineffective against it.
Secondary Disciplinary Analyses
As indicated in the methods section, we also explored the relationship
between cut scores and the following disciplinary actions: private admonition,
private reprimand, letters of warning, involuntary disbarment, disbarment on
consent, suspension (excluding interim suspension), interim suspension (risk
of harm or criminal conviction), public admonishment/reprimand/censure,
probation, order to pay restitution, and order to pay costs. We omitted these
models from the results largely for the sake of brevity. Variations of inclusion/
exclusion criteria and modeling approaches for these specific public protection
outcomes yield nearly 200 statistical models and findings and would thus
be too much to individually report on. Moreover, the findings fail to alter
the conclusion.
At a high level, none of these findings changes the overall narrative. As we
inflate the number of models, we would expect 5% of models to be statistically
significant by mere chance. And indeed, we do find more statistically significant
results, but they continue to be weak and most frequently in a positive direction
that suggests higher cut scores lead to more disciplinary actions taken. However,
some are negative. In particular, a weak statistically significant pattern emerges
suggesting that higher cut scores result in fewer private admonitions. Yet, this
pattern is counterbalanced with other emergent results suggesting that higher
cut scores also result in more attorneys placed on probation, more attorneys
disbarred on consent, and more attorneys suspended. In all cases, correlations
between cut scores and outcomes are weak. Moreover, these emergent
relationships largely vanish when state peculiarities are accounted for by using
multilevel models. Given the weakness and ephemerality of these findings, we
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therefore find no convincing evidence of a meaningful negative (or positive)
relationship between public protection and bar exam cut score.
Defining Public Protection
We define public protection precisely as the legal profession does through
the ABA and legal regulators: in terms of attorney complaints, charges, and
discipline. This approach envisions public protection in two ways. The first is
public-focused, asking whether clients are so dissatisfied that they file formal
complaints. The second is protection-focused, asking whether lawyers engage
in acts sufficiently improper to result in charges or discipline. If the choice of a
cut score altered the rate either of such public dissatisfaction with lawyers or of
such highly improper acts by lawyers, we would expect to see different levels of
complaints, charges, or discipline across jurisdictions. But we do not. Instead,
we see no relationship between the cut scores and these measures. Thus, to
the extent that complaints, charges, and discipline reflect grossly incompetent
lawyering of one kind or another, we have no evidence that cut scores affect the
rate of grossly incompetent lawyering. Our findings suggest that there is no
evidence that changing cut scores affects public protection, as conceptualized
and regulated by the legal profession through the ABA and legal regulators.
Complaints, charges, and discipline have major advantages over other
potential measures, such as malpractice filings, malpractice judgments,
or participation in client-attorney alternate dispute resolutions. Taking
complaints, charges, and discipline as measures reflects the considered
judgment of the profession. They are the measures that the ABA has chosen
to collect and share and that state legal regulators have chosen to report. As a
result, complaints, charges, and discipline are standardized across states in a
way that other measures are not. There thus appears to be no clean way to base
a national study on such other alternative measures.
One limitation of our focus on existing discipline practices is their
narrowness; they do not capture all harms by lawyers to the public. That is
because clients are injured not only by grossly incompetent attorneys. Lowquality and mediocre representation also cause harm. Consider the lawyer who
incorrectly tells a client that she has no case. The client loses a likely settlement,
yet the error is unlikely to result in a complaint, charge, or discipline.
Some argue that maintaining or raising bar exam scores reduces the
frequency of such low-quality and mediocre representation—even though it
does not reduce grossly incompetent representation. But available evidence
suggests otherwise. To start, those sitting for bar exams are among the most
successful members of our society. They have generally completed high
school, studies in college, and rigorous law school curricula. Such thriceproven individuals should be expected, all else being equal, to be competent to
practice law. To prevent low-quality and mediocre lawyering by such previous
high achievers, the better focus would not be on a pre-licensure exam, but on
the causes and conditions that lead lawyers to cut corners, engage in substance
abuse, and otherwise behave badly once ensconced in practice. Nor does the
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information that must be memorized to succeed on the bar exam correspond
to information that lawyers must apply in actual day-to-day practice. To
resolve client problems, legal research of applicable law, not the memorization
of general legal information, is the hallmark of competent lawyering. It is
sometimes argued that the ability to study and perform well for the bar exam
reflects a set of underlying skills that are important for being a good lawyer.
But in other research, we have shown that burdens on time to study (e.g.,
working or caring for dependents while studying) are a major impediment to
passing the bar exam.71 To a large degree, the bar exam tests whether one has
the luxury of engaging in full-time bar study. To our knowledge, no validation
study has demonstrated a relationship between bar exam performance and
performance in practice.72 That is not surprising, given that memorization
of general legal information is not a particularly important lawyering skill.
Alternative measures do exist that empirically relate to attorney performance
by dealing with important skills such as written and oral communication, legal
research, empathy, perspective-taking, leadership, and teamwork.73 That is one
reason that the failings of the bar exam are a perennial concern that has led to
reform efforts by the NCBE and state jurisdictions (California) to change the
structure of the bar exam.74
Another concern regarding the failings of the bar exam is that it is
not designed to measure the shortcomings in professionalism or ethical
behavior most alleged in clients’ complaints, or in legal malpractice claims
in particular. For example, more than 85% of legal malpractice claims do not
center on the attorney’s knowledge of or application of the law; rather, soft
skills such as communication and diligence account for the vast majority of
clients’ grievances.75 This is not news. When polled, attorneys recognized the
71

Erin Freiburger et al., The COVID-19 Pandemic and Bar Performance: Magnifying Adversities, Stress,
and Disparities Among Bar Test-Takers, Raising the Bar an AccessLex Institute Publication
(forthcoming 2021); Joshua Jackson & Tiffany Cochran, Approaching the Bar: An Analysis of PostGraduation Bar Exam Study Habits, AccessLex Institute (July 13, 2021), https://www.accesslex.
org/approaching-the-bar.
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While studies have revealed a correlation between performance on the bar exam and LSAT
scores and/or law school grades, validation of the exam would entail demonstrating that
performance on the bar exam predicts successful lawyering. That prior performance on a
standardized exam (e.g., LSAT) predicts later performance on a subsequent standardized
exam (i.e., the bar exam) is orthogonal to the question of whether that subsequent exam
predicts competent practice.
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Marjorie M. Shultz & Zedeck, Sheldon, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: A New Assessment for Use in
Law School Admission Decisions (July 31, 2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1442118 or http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1442118.
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See Next Generation of the Bar Exam, NCBE, https://www.ncbex.org/statistics-and-research/
nextgen-bar-exam/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2021); Blue Ribbon Commission on the Future of the Bar
Exam, State Bar of California, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/About-Us/Who-We-Are/
Committees/Blue-Ribbon-Commission (last visit Aug. 20, 2021).
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See Kiser supra note 31, 37-41; American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Lawyer’s
Professional Liability, Profile of Legal Malpractice Claims, 2008-2011 (2012).
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importance of soft skills for effective negotiation, but also the gap in these
skills within the profession.
It is perhaps not overly cynical to note that the problem of low-quality and
mediocre lawyering seems primarily to be a basis for action when it is a means
of excluding less privileged aspirants to the bar. The problem is not the focus of
disciplinary authorities, whether measured by data collected and standardized
or by programs implemented. The bar exam has never been validated as to
such outcomes.
What, then, is the function of the bar exam cut score, if not public protection
in any of the ways described above? We have evidence that the setting of the
cut score can widen or narrow racial and ethnic disparities, screen out low-SES
students, and create additional difficulty for those with the least means or with
care-taking responsibilities and for those needing to work over the summer.76
The loss of such potential lawyers from practice exacerbates shortfalls in
access to justice. In short, maintaining and raising cut scores demonstrably
harms the public without providing demonstrable benefit. Within the range
of scores that we have studied we can confidently state that lower cut scores
would improve public protection in some ways, while the best evidence is that
it would not cause contravening harms to the public in other ways.
Consequential Validity
The lack of statistical evidence that higher bar exam cut scores improve
public protection suggests that they lack consequential validity (i.e., that their
positive social consequences do not outweigh their negative ones). Consider
the entries on the other side of the ledger. The bar exam is a Jim Crow relic that
somehow survived the Civil Rights era despite failing to satisfy substantive
Title VII antidiscrimination standards. It was forged to achieve the exclusion
that still defines it and that heightened cut scores exacerbate. Racial and
ethnic minorities remain grossly underrepresented in the profession to the
mutual detriment of the public and the profession. These attorneys are more
likely than their white peers to start their careers in government service, public
service, or public interest work. They also provide service to minority clients,
engage in pro bono work, sit on community organizations’ boards, and mentor
younger attorneys at higher rates. As a result, the harms of excluding such
attorneys from practice fall disproportionately on potential clients who have
limited means or hail from underrepresented racial groups.
Arbitrarily heightened cut scores also entrench the justice gap, especially
for those with the fewest resources. Consider the largest U.S. jurisdiction,
California, where a recent study found that 85% of members of the public
76

Freiburger et al., supra note 71; Mitchel L. Winick et al., Examining the California Cut Score: An
Empirical Analysis of Minimum Competency, Public Protection, Disparate Impact, and National Standards,
AccessLex Institute ( Oct. 15, 2020), https://arc.accesslex.org/grantee/56/; Mitchel L.
Winick et. al., A Five-Year Retrospective Analysis of Cut Score Impact: California’s Proposed Supervised
Provisional License Program, AccessLex Institute (Nov. 11, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3716951.
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with civil legal problems failed to receive adequate legal help. The problem
was worse for those living in poverty, but even among Californians earning
more than 600% of the federal poverty line, more than three-quarters lacked
adequate legal help.77 Had California joined Minnesota in setting its cut score
at 1300 rather than 1440, it would have licensed 12,907 more attorneys between
February 2009 and July 2018, including more than 6000 new attorneys who are
people of color, a 26.4% uptick in the number who entered the profession.78
Moreover, these lawyers would have been particularly likely to provide services
to the people who most needed them.
Policy Recommendations for Meaningful Public Protection
It is time for legal regulators to seek new solutions. Research offers
abundant alternatives to the failed effort to weed out “bad apples” with a test
not designed to do so. Behavioral legal ethics and evidence-based reforms are
particularly promising pathways to pursue. Most obviously among potential
reforms, cut scores could be lowered. Law school graduates who fall somewhat
short of passing the bar could be permitted to enter practice following an
apprenticeship—a variation on a once-common practice. Post-entry training
could also be improved. Medicine requires residencies, many foreign
jurisdictions have multimonth bridge-the-gap programs, and continuing
legal education in one’s practice area could be mandatory.79 To address the
outperformance of public defender systems and large firms over assigned
defense counsel and smaller and solo firms, one could require robust lawyer
assistance programs, greater on-the-job mentoring requirements (from within
or outside a firm or office), recordkeeping support or administrative oversight
for solo and small firms, and mandatory public defender systems.80 Measures
of competence could also be improved, including by recognizing that the best
time to prevent incompetent practice is during practice. Currently, there is
a single ill-suited test of lawyerly competence before practice and primarily
77

California Justice Gap Study: The Service Gap—Findings and Recommendations, State Bar of
California, at 1 (2020), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/accessJustice/
Justice-Gap-Fact-Sheet-Service-Gap.pdf.
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piecemeal, reactive, self-dealing, client-initiated, and often underresourced
disciplinary proceedings subsequently.81 But jurisdictions could require a
series of tests of increasing difficulty, testing of active lawyers on their practice
areas,82 mandatory structured peer review that could include detailed and
area-specific, process-based checklists evaluations of dummy cases, and betterresourced disciplinary bodies with more substantive participation by those
outside the legal profession.83
A Failed Approach
Were legal regulators to decide that lawyer incompetence is more common
or more serious than their actions currently suggest, policy responses other than
heightened cut scores would be more effective. These responses would also
incur fewer social costs than heightened cut scores, which produce inequality,
discrimination, and underrepresentation. Worse, heightened cut scores violate
notions of just deserts by punishing people for ostensible bad propensities
rather than bad acts and by denying them opportunities earned through toil,
sacrifice, investment, and learning. The problems are interconnected. Social
realities of inequality, underrepresentation, and discrimination too often
overawe efforts to overcome needlessly heightened cut scores for candidates who
have matriculated from colleges and universities and successfully completed
law schools, demonstrating both mastery and repeated successes throughout
their careers.
Conclusion
It has been more than half a century since Congress enacted substantive
racial antidiscrimination standards for employment tests that the bar exam
does not meet. So reasoned a United States Court of Appeals in 1972. This
moral failure is not redeemed by the legal technicalities that have nonetheless
permitted the bar exam to continue. The legal profession violates its ideals of
justice and fairness and harms the public by screening out qualified aspiring
81
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lawyers who are disproportionately from underrepresented and disadvantaged
groups.
It is no answer that heightened cut scores prevent attorney malfeasance.
That claim has always been dubious on its face. The bar exam was not
designed for that purpose, and most lawyer discipline comes decades after the
administration of the test. Yet the question was difficult to study empirically,
given limitations of the data. Indeed, the main consequence of prior studies was
undue public endorsement of an unlikely hypothesis. This study overcomes
several prior data limitations to confirm common sense. After rigorous
statistical investigation, we find no evidence to support the claim that lower
cut scores lead to greater lawyer misconduct. The discussion should thus be
shifted from unsupported claims of malfeasance to the demonstrable public
benefits granted by lower cut scores. Heightened cut scores are professional
gatekeeping masked as public protection.
The time has come for legal regulators to undertake the empirically validated
path to public protection that does exist: lowering cut scores. Doing so would
meet twin legal crises: lack of diversity in the profession and lack of access to
justice for all. It would grow the bar; diversify practice; drive upward mobility;
and provide access to lawyers more likely to serve as counsel for government,
community, public-interest, and underrepresented-minority clients. In this
way, the demonstrable tragedy of heightened cut scores points the way to the
ready-at-hand opportunity of more equitable replacements.
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Safeguard or Barrier Appendix
Methods
Linear Regression (Disaggregated)
Linear regression is arguably the most well-known and most-employed
method in statistical analysis. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
is one approach to linear regression. We use OLS regression to model the
relationship between the cut score required to pass the bar exam and the
number of complaints, charges, and disciplinary actions taken in each state
from 2013-2018. Given the data, OLS regression offers the best linear fit to the
data. A linear fit is monotonic, thereby addressing the question of whether
increases in the bar exam cut score correspond to increases (or decreases) in
the number of complaints, charges, and/or disciplinary actions taken against
attorneys. Linear regression also provides useful statistics such as effect sizes
and the proportion of variance explained (R2), each of which offers insight
into the strength of a given relationship.
Linear Regression (Aggregated)
In this series of models, we calculated each state’s average public, private,
and total public protection measures, and used this average as the outcome
variable rather than the disaggregated data. Thus, there is only one outcome
for each state, as opposed to one outcome for each year. Thereafter, the
analytic approach was identical to that applied to the disaggregated data:
OLS linear regression. This approach distills the within-state variation into
a single estimate of each public protection measure for that state. By virtue
of being the state average, it has some appeal in being closer to what we would
expect from that state, and correspondingly serves as a better estimate of an
average observation at a given cut score. However, despite its intuitive appeal,
this approach may needlessly sacrifice statistical power to detect relationships
between cut score and public protection. Multilevel modeling was applied as
a follow-up analysis.
Multilevel Modeling
Multilevel modeling (also called mixed-effects modeling) is a statistical
method that allows for the control of nested data.1 Nested data arises whenever
there are multiple observations within a single unit of analysis, and multiple
units exist within the data. An analysis of school data, for example, may
include twenty students per classroom, and fifty classrooms. Mathematically,
a baseline model with no predictors that controls for classroom effects would
be written as
Yij = γ00 + u0j + eij,
1

Brady T. West et al., Linear Mixed Models (2d ed. 2015); Handbook
Multilevel Analysis (Joop Hox & J. Kyle Roberts eds., 2011).
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where i represents the ith observation (the student), and j represents the jth
cluster (the classroom). The statistic γ00 represents the overall mean of the
dependent measure Y, while u0j captures the classroom-specific adjustment
to γ00 (referred to as the cluster-level error term). The final term eij captures
the deviation of observation i from its cluster mean (the deviation of a given
student from her classroom average).
When predictors are added to the model, the expression is often generalized
to the following by using matrix notation.
Yj = Xjγ + ZjUj + ej,
where Yj is now an nj ✕ 1 response vector for the jth cluster, Xj is an n ✕ p design
matrix; γ is an unknown p ✕ 1 vector of fixed parameters to be estimated; Zj
is an nj ✕ k design matrix of random effects; Uj is a k ✕ 1 vector of unknown
random effects to be estimated; and ej is an nj ✕ 1 vector of residuals. Newly
incorporated predictors are included in the Xjγ piece of the expression, and
new incorporated cluster specific adjustments such as u0j are incorporated into
the ZjUj part of the expression. The vector ej continues to capture individual
deviations from cluster-level means on the outcome vector Yj.
Continuing our example, controlling for classroom variation via this
statistical approach allows for better estimates of student-level effects by
accounting for nuances that are unique to each classroom. In this way, student
effects are less confounded with classroom-specific features.
In our case, we have up to six observations (2013-2018) per public protection
measure for each state, and each state has a different score required to pass the
bar exam. It may be argued that there are state-specific factors that contribute
to variation in the number of complaints, charges, and disciplines that could
obscure the relationship between cut score and public protection. To account
for this, we can use multilevel modeling to account for state-specific variation.
Our model inclusive of cut score as a predictor can be written as
Yij = γ00 + u0j + γ01 cutscoreij + eij,
Where i represents the observation (year between 2013 and 2018) and j
represents the state.2 Thus, Yij represents the ith observation for the jth state
on one of the three public protection outcomes, γ00 is the overall average of
the specified public protection outcome, u0j is the state-specific adjustment to
the overall average of the public protection outcome, γ01 is the estimated fixed
2

It is assumed that observations within a cluster are independent. In these models, the
observations within the cluster correspond to states’ time points. To assume independence
is therefore to assume that there is no longitudinal relationship within a state’s public
protection measures. Recognizing that this may be a bold assumption, we constructed
additional models in which time rather than state is the cluster. Unfortunately, statistical
limitations of only one observation per time point for each state preclude us from controlling
for both state and time random effects simultaneously. In the alternative models clustering
on time, the emergent results only strengthen the findings of this paper. Consequently,
we note here that these models were explored but ultimately omitted because we felt that
controlling for within-state variation offered greater theoretical interpretability than the
alternative, and the choice was inconsequential to the findings of our research.
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effect of cut score on the public protection outcome applied to the ith observed
cut score in the jth state, and eij is the residual associated with observation i in
state j for the modeled public protection outcome.
Controlling for state-level variation in this way can filter out this additional
noise when assessing the relationship between bar exam cut score and public
protection.3
Hypothesis Testing
Statistical models provide coefficients that can be used to test certain
statistical hypotheses. Procedurally, the researcher declares a hypothesis
(called the null hypothesis, denoted H0), then seeks evidence from a statistical
model or hypothesis test to refute the declared hypothesis. The evidence
contrary to the null hypothesis is said to favor the alternative hypothesis
(denoted H1 or HA).
In this research, our null hypothesis is that there is no statistically significant
relationship between cut score and any of the public protection measures
defined throughout this manuscript. Stated formally,
H0: γ01 = 0
H1: γ01 ≠ 0
where γ01 refers to the regression coefficient describing the relationship between
the bar exam cut score and the public protection measure of interest.
Any statistical evidence rejecting the null hypothesis would lead us to
conclude that a relationship may exist, and we are subsequently left to interpret
its direction (positive or negative). Positive relationships indicate that higher
cut scores correspond to more complaints, charges, and/or disciplinary actions,
while negative relationships indicate that higher cut scores correspond to fewer
complaints, charges, and/or disciplinary actions. Failure to reject the null
hypothesis implies there is no evidence of a relationship between cut score and
public protection. This framing of the null and alternative hypotheses takes a
neutral position on whether such a relationship exists by seeking evidence to
reject neutrality.
Outliers
As good practice, we filtered out outliers in this data on the basis of Cook’s
distance.4 Whenever Cook’s distance was larger than four divided by the
number of observations,5 the corresponding observation was considered an
3

Our models followed suggested procedures by West et al., supra note 1. For a more
technical look at multilevel modeling, please review id.; Handbook of Advanced
Multilevel Analysis, supra note 1.
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R. Dennis Cook, Detection of Influential Observation in Linear Regression, 19 Technometrics 15
(1977).
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Kim Choongrak & Barry E. Storer, Reference Values for Cook’s Distance, Communications in Statistics,
25 Simulation & Computation 691 (1996).
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outlier and subsequently removed. For each measure, there were few outlying
cases. However, the number of observations, and thus the observations
deemed as outliers, varied across different statistical analyses.
To evaluate sensitivity to outliers, we also analyzed the data inclusive of
outliers. We found no relevant differences with or without outliers that would
change the general interpretation of the findings.6 We therefore report only
the results with outliers removed from the data, and include additional tests in
supplemental materials available online.
Analytic Tools
All analyses have been run with two statistical software programs and
confirmed for agreement. The data were first analyzed using the sci-kit learn7
and statsmodels8 modules in Python 3.7. Next, data were confirmed for
agreement with the lme49 and baseline statistical tools in R 4.0.2.10 Visuals
were constructed using seaborn,11 matplotlib,12 and ggplot2.13 Tables were
prepared using stargazer.14

6

Statistical significance varied across some models. However, the vast majority of statistically
significant effects, whenever found, suggested that the relationship between cut score and
the corresponding disciplinary outcome was positive, not negative. The few exceptions
were with the specific disciplinary action of private admonishment discussed elsewhere in
this manuscript. This would imply that as the cut score increases, the number of complaints,
charges, or disciplinary actions increases. Moreover, the effect sizes in all cases were very
small. Since we sought to show that there was no negative relationship between the bar
exam cut score and either complaints, charges, or disciplinary actions, we deemed these
fluctuations in significance and trivial positive relationships to be not pertinent to our
general conclusion.

7

Fabian Pedregosa et al., Scikit-learn: Machine Learning in Python, 12 J. Machine Learning Res.
2825 (2011).
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Skipper Seabold & Josef Perktold, Statsmodels: Econometric and Statistical Modeling with Python, 9
SciPy 92 (2010).
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Douglas Bates et al., Fitting Linear Mixed-Effects Models Using lme4, 67 J. Statistical Software 1
(2015).
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The R Project for Statistical Computing, R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing,
R-Project, https://www.R-project.org/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2021).
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Statistical data visualization, Seaborn, https://seaborn.pydata.org/index.html (last visited Feb.
13, 2021).

12

John D. Hunter, Matplotlib: A 2D Graphics Environment, 9 Computing Science & Engineering
90 (2007).
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Hadley Wickham, Elegant Graphics for Data Analysis, ggplot2 (2016), https://ggplot2.tidyverse.
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Marek Hlavac, stargazer: Well-Formatted Regression and Summary Statistics Tables, R package (2018),
https://sites.google.com/site/marekhlavac/software/stargazer.
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Summary of Additional Findings

Aggregated Linear Regression
When the OLS models in which each state’s average across all years was
analyzed, we (again) found no meaningfully significant negative relationships
between states’ minimum passing bar exam cut score and public protection
measures. Statistically significant relationships were fewer than those found in
the disaggregated OLS models and, in fact, were only marginally significant.
These relationships were once again positive and weak wherever present. The
largest R2 for these models was 0.065.
Specific findings were as follows. We observed a marginally significant and
positive relationship between states’ bar exam cut scores and the number of
complaints filed per 1000 attorneys (b = 2.63, p = .09, R2 = .065). The relationship
between cut score and charges filed per 1000 attorneys was non-significant (b
= .078, p = .46, R2 = .01), as was the relationship between cut score and the
number of disciplinary actions taken per 1000 attorneys (b = -.06, p = .70, R2
= .003). These results hold independent of whether supplemental states are
included or excluded, and independent of whether outliers are retained or
omitted. Aggregated regression results are summarized below in Table A.1.

Table A.1. Results of Aggregated OLS Regression for Public Protection
Outcomes
Dependent Variable
Complaints per
1000 (SE)

Charges per
1000 (SE)

Discipline per
1000 (SE)

2.63*

0.08

-0.06

(1.51)

(0.11)

(0.15)

-280.16

-7.32

12.76

(202.38)

(14.26)

(20.17)

Observations

46

47

47

R2

0.065

0.012

0.003

Adjusted R2

0.044

-0.01

-0.02

Residual Std. Error

28.68 (df = 44)

2.29 (df = 45)

2.94 (df = 45)

F-Statistic

3.06* (df = 1; 44)

0.55 (df = 1; 45)

0.15 (df = 1; 45)

Cut Score

Constant

Note:

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
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Multilevel Modeling
Results of multilevel regression analyses were similar to those of the
aggregated and disaggregated OLS models. We find no meaningfully
significant negative relationships between states’ minimum passing bar exam
cut score and our public protection measures. All but one regression coefficient
are positive, and none of them are statistically significant at p < .05. Unlike
OLS regression models, however, multilevel modeling does not provide R2
statistics. To supplement this, we use Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC),
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), and the Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT)
to describe the fit of the model with and without cut score as a predictor.
AIC and BIC are designed to favor parsimony by precluding superfluous
variables from entering the model. For both statistics, lower values reflect
a better model; if two models have approximately similar AIC and BIC, the
more parsimonious model is recommended. The LRT tests for a statistically
significant difference between two models. If the test is not statistically
significant, there is no reason to believe a difference exists between the two
models, and thus the more parsimonious of the two is preferred. When a
statistically significant difference is present, the model with the higher loglikelihood value is preferred.
Specific findings were as follows. There were no statistically significant
relationships between states’ bar exam cut scores and the number of complaints
filed per 1000 attorneys (b = 2.41, p = 0.1). AIC (2363.8) and BIC (2378.2)
for the model containing cut score as a predictor of complaints were only
marginally different from those without cut score as a predictor (AIC = 2364.7;
BIC = 2375.6). The LRT suggests there is no statistically significant difference
between the models with or without cut score as a predictor (χ2(1) = 2.91, p = .09).
Both AIC/BIC and the LRT suggest that the cut score does not contribute
to predicting the number of complaints per 1000 attorneys. Similarly, there
was no statistically significant relationship between states’ bar exam cut score
and either the number of charges filed after probable cause per 1000 attorneys
(b = .101, p = 0.13). AIC (784.5) and BIC (798.6) for the model including cut
score were notably larger than the model omitting cut score (AIC = 735.1; BIC
= 745.6), suggesting the inclusion of cut score is superfluous. Additionally,
the LRT suggested a strong difference between the model with or without cut
scores included as a predictor, but in favor of the more parsimonious model in
which cut score was omitted (χ2(1) = 47.4, p < .001). Thus, the multilevel models
suggest there is no evidence to support a meaningful relationship between cut
score and the number of charges filed per 1000 attorneys. Finally, we found no
relationship between cut score and the number of disciplinary actions taken
per 1000 attorneys (b = -.02, p = .87). The AIC, BIC, and LRT findings were
similar to those of the charges models. AIC (964.2) and BIC (978.4) for the
model with cut score as a predictor were much larger than those in the model
that did not include cut score (AIC = 878.6; BIC = 889.1). Similarly, the LRT
suggested a strong statistical difference between the models, again favoring
the model omitting cut score (χ2(1) = 83.6, p < .001). Taken together, these
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findings suggest there is no evidence of a relationship between the bar exam
cut score and disciplinary actions taken per 1000 attorneys. As with other
models, these results held independent of whether supplemental states were
included or excluded, and independent of whether outliers were retained or
omitted. Results for multilevel modeling are summarized below in Table A.2.

Table A.2. Results of Multilevel Modeling for Public Protection Outcomes
Dependent Variable
Complaints per
1000 (SE)

Charges per
1000 (SE)

Discipline per
1000 (SE)

2.41*

0.10

-0.02

(1.42)

(0.07)

(0.11)

-249.62

-10.67

6.91

(191.29)

(8.82)

(14.20)

Observations

273

248

258

Log Likelihood

-1174.23

-388.25

-478.0

AIC

2356.46

784.50

964.21

BIC

2370.89

798.56

978.42

Cut Score
Constant

Note:

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

High-Level Lag Analysis
Prior research has argued that lawyer discipline seldom occurs during the
first years of practice. A lag is posited to exist between the time a lawyer
passes the bar and when discipline occurs. Anticipating this lag effect, we
conducted additional analyses controlling for its impact. These models utilize
states’ cut scores from 2005 rather than their current cut scores. Given that our
discipline data ranges from 2013 to 2018, this gives us an eight- to thirteen-year
lag window.
Linear regressions, aggregated regressions, and multilevel models were
again used to evaluate the impact of lag analyses. Results of these analyses
were narratively indistinguishable from analyses using current cut scores.
That is, we found no significant negative relationship between cut scores and
disciplinary actions against attorneys. Moreover, the number of disciplinary
actions taken against attorneys per 1000 continues to be extraordinarily small.
Given that the multilevel models offer the most rigorous statistical approach
and that there were no narrative changes across other models, we report
only the multilevel model results here (see Table A.3). AIC, BIC, and log-
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likelihood statistics revealed no significant changes to the models with and
without cut score included as a predictor, thus suggesting it is not a useful
predictor of lawyer discipline. Collectively, these lag analyses suggest prima
facie evidence15 that lawyer discipline is not driven by older attorneys.
Table A.3. Lag Analysis Results of Multilevel Modeling for Public
Protection Outcomes
Dependent Variable
Complaints per
1000 (SE)

Charges per
1000 (SE)

Discipline per
1000 (SE)

0.78

0.09

-0.07

(1.10)

(0.05)

(0.08)

-31.28

-8.80

14.37

(147.18)

(6.57)

(10.60)

Observations

260

235

245

Log Likelihood

-1121.43

-371.35

-455.78

AIC

2250.86

750.71

919.57

BIC

2265.10

764.55

933.57

Cut Score
Constant

Note:

15

*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01

The small number of disciplinary actions taken per 1000 attorneys suggests that additional
analyses of lag effects would be of limited use from a policy perspective, though it could
be methodologically interesting. Additional models using cut scores from different time
windows (e.g., fifteen years, twenty years, thirty years, etc.) could be analyzed. Alternatively,
statistical models accounting for the amount of time an attorney has practiced law could be
instrumental both in identifying when (if ever) during the course of a career an attorney is
most likely to be disciplined, and in more precisely controlling for the lag effect.

